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Meet-Cloud for Secure and Accurate Distribution of Negative
Messages in Vehicular Ad hoc Network
Baohua Huang, Xiaolu Cheng, Caixia Huang∗ , and Wei Cheng
Abstract: Keeping Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) from attacks requires secure and efficient distribution of
information about bad entities. Negative messages are pieces of information that define the negative attributes
of vehicles. By formally defining the negative message, we observe that accuracy is essential for its efficient
distribution. We formally define the coverage percentage and accurate coverage percentage to describe the
availability and distribution efficiency of negative message. These two metrics can jointly evaluate the performance
of a distribution method. To obtain both high coverage percentage and high accurate coverage percentage, we
propose meet-cloud, a scheme based on meet-table and cloud computing to securely and accurately distribute
negative messages in VANET. A meet-table in a Road Side Unit (RSU) records the vehicles it encounters. All meettables are sent to cloud service to aggregate a global meet-table. The algorithm for distributing and redistributing
negative messages are designed. Security analysis shows that meet-cloud is secure against fake and holding on to
negative message attacks. Simulations and analysis demonstrate that meet-cloud is secure under denial of service
and fake meet-table attacks. The simulation results also justify that meet-cloud outperforms the RSU broadcast
and epidemic model.
Key words: negative message; accurate coverage percentage; meet-table; VANET; cloud computing

1 Introduction
Similar to the existing information systems, information
management is the foundation of Vehicular Ad hoc
Network (VANET) and has been extensively studied[1] . As
the most significant and attractive VANET application is to
improve the safety of transportation[2] , the management of
• Baohua Huang is with the School of Computer and
Electronic Information, Guangxi University, Nanning
530004, China. E-mail: bhhuang66@gxu.edu.cn.
• Xiaolu Cheng and Wei Cheng are with the Department
of Computer Science, Virginia Commonwealth University,
Richmond, VA 23220, USA. E-mail: chengx3@vcu.edu;
wcheng3@vcu.edu.
• Caixia Huang is with the School of Computer Engineering
and Applied Mathematics, Changsha University, Changsha
410003, China. E-mail: ken5cs@foxmail.com.
∗ To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Manuscript received: 2017-07-28; accepted: 2017-09-14

information related to safety should be paid more attention.
The traditional information related to safety includes
speed limit, work zone notification, curve warning, and
accident information. With the development of VANET,
dangerous and untrustworthy vehicle identification
information can also play an important role in safety.
We call this type of information negative messages, as
they are used to describe the negative attributes of a
vehicle. Negative messages include dangerous drivers,
untrustworthy certificates, and black lists, but are not
limited to these messages.
Comparing with other information in VANET, a
negative message features two significant properties: (1)
it describes a definite vehicle, that is, the objective vehicle;
and (2) it is cared by the vehicles that may encounter the
objective vehicle. Accordingly, a negative message needs
not to be distributed to all vehicles in the VANET. Instead,
the negative message should be distributed to a subset of
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vehicles that may encounter the objective vehicle.
Although information management in the VANET has
been extensively studied[1] , and a few works have focused
on distributing Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in the
VANET[3, 4] , no work elucidates the concept of negative
messages to the best of our knowledge. In Ref. [3], the
Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII) tries to distribute
CRL to vehicles through Road Side Unit (RSU) broadcast.
This method requires a large number of RSU and high cost.
In Ref. [4], Haas et al. attempted to propagate CRL in
an epidemic fashion. The epidemic method can distribute
CRL to all vehicles with a less number of RSU and less
time, but it requires large storage and communication
capacity in the VANET.
In our previous work[5] , we propose meet-table to
optimize CRL propagation in the VANET. As human
movements follow simple reproducible patterns[6] and the
trajectories of vehicles are part of human movements, the
trajectories of vehicles are certainly reproducible. In other
words, a vehicle may encounter RSUs and other vehicles
in a certain set every day. Therefore, with the help of meettable, we can efficiently distribute a vehicle’s negative
message through the encountered RSUs and vehicles.
In Ref. [7], we also proposed the concept of negative
message and a scheme based on meet-table and cloud
computing to distribute negative messages in the VANET.
In the proposed scheme, every RSU or vehicle features a
meet-table that records the vehicles encountering it. All
the RSUs’ meet-tables are sent to the cloud for storage
and aggregation. The cloud service uses NoSQL database
to manipulate the meet-table and negative messages in a
highly scalable and efficient manner[8] .
In this paper, we integrate previous works and extend
the definitions, algorithms, analysis, and simulations. Our
major contributions include the followings:
(1) We add the concept of negative message document
to extend the concept of negative message for describing
negative attributes such as CRL, and discuss the effect of
performance.
(2) We describe and analyze the scheme, algorithms,
and data structures in detail.
(3) We present simulation results, including the results
of message delay simulation, fake meet-table attack
simulation, and Denial of Service (DoS) attack simulation.

2 Negative Message and Evaluation of Its
Distribution Method
A negative message describes the negative attributes of a
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particular vehicle, that is, the objective vehicle. A negative
message must be distributed to the vehicles that may
encounter the objective vehicle. The general information
management scheme attempts to distribute all messages
to all the vehicles. Thus, a number of unnecessary
distributions are present. Therefore, these schemes are
inefficient for distributing negative messages.
We define the set of vehicles and RSUs in the VANET
as follows.
V = {vi |0 6 i 6 nV }

(1)

U = {ui |0 6 i 6 nU }

(2)

V represents the set of all vehicles in the VANET. nV
refers to the number of vehicles in V . U denotes the set
of all RSUs, and nU corresponds to the number of RSUs
in U .
2.1

Negative message and negative message document

A negative message uniquely binds to an objective vehicle.
As the negative message is unusable for all vehicles in the
VANET, it features a set of vehicles that may care about it.
Definition 1: A negative message is a negative
description of a vehicle. Formally, a negative message is
defined as follows:
def

m = < o, d, C >

(3)

where m is the negative message, and it is a 3-tuple
consisted by o, d, and C; o denotes the objective vehicle of
m; d is the data in the message describing o; and C is a set
of vehicles that concern the message m.
The negative messages are often generated by
authority.
The authority generally compiles several
negative messages and signs them as a whole document.
We call this type of document as a negative message
document, or a negative document in short.
Definition 2: A negative message document is a set of
negative messages with a signature. Formally, a negative
message document is described as follows:
def

D = < M, a >

(4)

M = {mi |0 6 i 6 nM }

(5)

where D is the negative message document, M is the set of
negative messages, a is the authority, and nM is the number
of elements in M .
Given the presence of various objective vehicles in
a negative message document, efficiently distributing
negative message document becomes more complicated
and challenging than distributing negative messages
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separately.
2.2 Evaluation criteria
The general message dissemination methods in the
VANET attempt to distribute data to all the vehicles. These
methods aim to achieve a high percentage of vehicles
possessing a message, that is, the possessing percentage.
Definition 3: The possessing percentage is the percent
of vehicles possessing a message in all vehicles. Formally,
the possessing percentage is described as follows:
r=

|B| |B|
=
|V | nV

(6)

where B is the set of vehicles possessing the negative
message, and V is the set of all vehicles in the VANET.
The existing methods, which attempt to obtain a high
possessing percentage, are not very efficient and suitable
for negative messages. For example, broadcasting CRL
in a nationwide VANET is not only infeasible but also
unnecessary[5] .
In the VANET, we should process the negative message
m in a way that: (1) we can push m to all vehicles as soon
as possible; (2) every vehicle can achieve m with high
availability. To correctly evaluate the method processing
negative messages, we define the coverage percentage and
accurate coverage percentage as follows.
Definition 4: The coverage percentage of a negative
message is the percent of vehicles possessing the message
in vehicles concerning the message.
Formally, the
coverage percentage is presented as follows:
{
∑
1, b ∈ C;
b∈B
0, b ∈
/C
|B ∩ C|
rc =
=
(7)
|C|
|C|
Definition 5: The accurate coverage percentage of a
negative message is the percent of vehicles concerning the
message in vehicles possessing the message. Formally, the
accurate coverage percentage is computed according to the
following:
{
∑
1, b ∈ C;
b∈B
0, b ∈
/C
|B ∩ C|
=
(8)
rac =
|B|
|B|
where C is a set of vehicles that concern the message.
The coverage percentage of a negative message represents
the availability of the message, and the accurate coverage
percentage of the message represents the efficiency of the
distribution method.
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Based on the definitions of coverage percentage and
accurate coverage percentage of a negative message,
we can obtain the evaluation criteria for evaluating the
negative message distribution method.
Evaluation-Criterion 1: A good negative message
distribution method should possess both high coverage
percentage and high accurate coverage percentage.
A distribution method may feature a high possessing
percentage but a low coverage percentage and accurate
coverage percentage, as the possessed messages may not
accurately cover the vehicles that really care the message.

3

Meet-Cloud

According to Evaluation-Criterion 1, an ideal model of
distributing the negative message m in a VANET is to
make C, the set of vehicles concerning m, equal to B,
which is the set of vehicles possessing m. In this model,
rc = rac = 100%. Thus, this model is the most available
and efficient. The general methods of disseminating
information in the VANET attempt to broadcast m to all
the vehicles in V ; their coverage percentage rc → 100%,
but their accurate coverage percentage rac → 0%. These
methods are inapplicable in negative message distribution.
We propose the meet-cloud, a scheme for distributing
negative messages in a VANET based on the meet-table
and cloud computing, to solve the problem.
3.1

Definition of meet-table and global meet-table

To make C equal to B, we must locate the vehicles in
C. Consequently, we propose the meet-table in an RSU
or a vehicle to record the vehicles that pass the RSU or the
vehicle. Formally, as the meet-table of w, an RSU or a
vehicle, can be defined as follows:
Tw = {pi |0 6 i 6 nTw }
def

(9)

pi = < v, t, c >

(10)

T = {Ti |0 6 i 6 nU }

(11)

where Tw is the meet-table generated by w; nTw is the
number of elements in Tw ; pi is the i-th recorder in Tw ,
and it is a 3-tuple consisting of v, t, and c; v is a vehicle
that passed w c times by time t. T is the set of all meettables in the RSUs.
The meet-tables are distributed in the RSUs. We
need to construct a global meet-table for negative message
distribution. Thus, meet-tables must be aggregated to
a global form. Formally, the global meet-table can be
defined as follows:
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G = {gi |0 6 i 6 nG }
def

gi = < v, Ui >

(12)
(13)

where G is the global meet-table; nG is the number of
elements in G. gi is the i-th recorder of G, and it’s a 2tuple. v is the vehicle that passed all the RSUs in Ui .
The algorithm for aggregate meet-tables T to global
meet-table G is presented in Algorithm 1.
In a large VANET, the size of G may be huge,
and its recorders feature variable lengths; thus, G
should be processed with the NoSQL database[9] in a
cloud computing environment. We, therefore, propose a
meet-cloud to use the meet-table and cloud computing
technology.
3.2 Deployment of meet-cloud
With the help of meet-table and cloud computing, we
can efficiently distribute negative messages in a VANET.
The deployment of components in meet-cloud is shown in
Fig. 1.
In the meet-cloud, a cloud service runs on the Internet
to process the global meet-table and to distribute negative
messages.
The meet-cloud utilizes high scalability
and virtualization of cloud computing[10, 11] and NoSQL
database to serve global meet-table processing and
negative messages distribution.
RSUs are built at the roadsides. The RSUs are
also connected to the Internet through wired or wireless
communication channels, e.g., 5G[12] . Every RSU records
the vehicles passing it in its meet-table.
The meet-table of an RSU can be sent to the cloud
service in a planned schedule. When an RSU receives a
negative message from the cloud service, it broadcasts the
message to the vehicles passing it.

Fig. 1

Deployment of meet-cloud.

A vehicle travels along its ways. When a vehicle
passes an RSU on the roadside, it can be recorded by the
RSU. At the same time, the vehicle accepts the messages
broadcasted by the RSU. If this vehicle encounters other
vehicles, it can record them into its meet-table and
broadcast the messages obtained from the RSUs it passed
by.
3.3

Architecture and principle of meet-cloud

The principle of meet-cloud shown in Fig. 1 can be
illustrated with the architecture shown in Fig. 2.
In the meet-cloud shown in Fig. 2,
V = {v1 , v2 , v3 , v4 }

(14)

U = {u1 , u2 , u3 , u4 }

(15)

Tu1 = {< v1 , ... >}

(16)

Tu2 = {< v3 , ... >, < v4 , ... >}

(17)

Tu3 = {< v1 , ... >, < v3 , ... >, < v4 , ... >}

(18)

Tu4 = {< v2 , ... >}

(19)

Fig. 2

Architecture of meet-cloud.
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G = {< v1 , {u1 , u3 } >, < v2 , {u4 } >,
< v3 , {u2 , u3 } >, < v4 , {u2 , u3 , u4 } >}
def

m3 = < v3 , d, {v1 , v4 } >
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(20)

service, RSUs, and vehicles in an asynchronous and
distributed model.

(21)

3.5

Thus, when m3 is sent to the cloud service for
distribution, it can find < u3 , {u2 , u3 } > from G, and it
can send m3 to u2 and u3 for broadcasting. u1 and u4 need
not to broadcast m3 at all. Therefore, v1 and v4 will receive
m3 , but v2 will not.
In a VANET, if we know C, which is the set of vehicles
that care the negative message m, we can accurately
distribute m to vehicles in C. Vehicles in C include those
that may encounter the objective vehicle of m. According
to the reproducible movement patterns of humans[6] , we
can assume that the vehicles passing by the same RSU may
encounter each other. Thus, we can record the vehicles
passing an RSU or a vehicle with meet-table. For the
negative message m, if ∃pi ∈ Tw , pi .v = m.o, then m
should be distributed through w.
3.4 Negative message distribution algorithm
A negative message describes a negative attribute of its
objective vehicle. A negative message is often distributed
by an authorized entity. For example, a CRL is a typical
negative message issued by a Certificate Authority (CA).
In the proposed meet-cloud, the algorithm for distributing
negative messages is presented in Algorithm 2.
Alg-Distribute is invoked by the entity that wants to
distribute the message m, and executed by the cloud

Negative message redistribution algorithm

When the RSU u encounters a vehicle v that it never
encountered before, the RSU must redistribute the negative
messages of the vehicle to maintain high coverage
percentage and accurate coverage percentage of the
messages. The negative message redistribution algorithm
is presented in Algorithm 3.
Alg-Redistribute is invoked by RSUs and executed by
RSUs and vehicles in an asynchronous and distributed
model. Every RSU executes its own Alg-Redistribute
procedure. The cloud service provides the interface for
querying negative messages of a vehicle.

4

Performance and Security Analysis

The meet-cloud utilizes the meet-table and cloud
computing to securely and accurately distribute negative
messages in a VANET. After describing all details of our
design, we now compare it with other methods to evaluate
its performance and analyze its security. In the next
section, we present the simulation results.
4.1

Performance analysis

Two typical methods, the RSU broadcast[3] and epidemic
model[4] , are generally used in a VANET to distribute
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negative messages. We, therefore, compare our design
with these methods in terms of complexity and coverage.
4.1.1 Complexity
We define several average quantities in a VANET.
The average number of RSUs that a vehicle may
encounter is computed as follows:
∑
nT
(22)
n¯u = u∈U u
nV
The average number of vehicles that an RSU may
encounter is as follows:
∑
nT
n¯v = u∈U u
(23)
nU
Then, we can calculate complexities of the meet-table,
RSU broadcast, and epidemic model. The results are
shown in Table 1.
From Table 1, we can observe the following:
(1) Meet-cloud can reduce communications from the
core to the RSU and the RSU to a vehicle as n¯u is smaller
than nU .
(2) Meet-cloud can reduce communications between
vehicles, as n¯u and n¯v are smaller than nV .
(3) Meet-cloud can reduce vehicle storage as n¯u and
n¯v are smaller than nV in a large VANET.
4.1.2 Message coverage metric
The RSU broadcast and epidemic models attempt to
distribute messages to all vehicles, but the meet-cloud
strives to distribute messages to the right vehicles that
really care the message. Table 2 shows the message
coverage metrics of these methods in a very large VANET.
From Table 2, we can observe that the RSU broadcast
and epidemic models are not highly efficient. According
to Evaluation-Criterion 1 and Table 2, the meet-table is the
Table 1
Complexity

best.
4.2

Security analysis

In this section, we provide the attack model and analyze
the security of the meet-table. The next section discusses
the simulation results of fake meet-table attack and DoS
attack.
4.2.1

Attack model

In the proposed scheme, we assume that the authorized
entity, cloud Service, most RSUs, and most vehicles are
trustworthy. Under this assumption, we can profile the
major attacks that can be conducted on the scheme.
(1) Fake negative message attack. An attacker tries to
distribute an untrue negative message of a target vehicle to
disturb communication and operation of the victim.
(2) Holding on to negative message attack. An
attacker tries to prevent the vehicles that received negative
messages from the RSUs from broadcasting the negative
message to other vehicles encountered.
(3) Fake meet-table attack. An attacker tries to build a
fake meet-table by driving the vehicle to pass numerous
RSUs that are unnecessary in a normal human travel
model.
(4) DoS attack.
An attacker tries to jam the
broadcasting of RSUs, to block the negative messages
pushed from the cloud service, to stop cloud service, and
to broadcast a huge number of garbage messages.
4.2.2

Security of the scheme

From the architecture and the algorithms described above,
we know that the proposed scheme follows a distributed
and asynchronous model. Thus, the scheme features
potential anti-attack properties. Also, utilizing the matured
cloud computing technology, the cloud service becomes
scale free and hard to attack.

Complexity of distributing method.

Meet-cloud

Epidemic

RSU broadcast

nM n¯u

N/A

nM nU

RSU to vehicle communication

nM n¯u n¯v

N/A

nM nU n¯v

Vehicle to vehicle communication

nm n¯u n¯v

nM nV 2

N/A

Core to RSU communication

Core storage
Vehicle storage

nM + nv n¯u

N/A

N/A

nM n¯u n¯v

nM nV

nM nV

nU nV

N/A

N/A

Computing

Table 2
Metric

Message coverage metrics of distributing methods in very large VANET.

Possessing percentage (%)

Coverage percentage (%)

Accurate coverage percentage (%)

→0

→ 100

→ 100

Epidemic

→ 100

→ 100

→ 100

RSU broadcast

→ 100

→0

→0

Meet-cloud
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Numerous anti-attack measurements are available for
fake negative message attack. For example, cloud service
can authenticate the sender; negative messages may be
signed with a signature for verification in RSUs and
vehicles.
If a vehicle is controlled by an attacker, it may not
broadcast negative messages that are received from RSUs
and other vehicles to the vehicles it encounters. This
holding of negative message attack can hardly affect the
propagation of negative messages in a VANET, given that
compared with other uncontrolled vehicles, the number of
vehicles controlled by the attacker is remarkable less.
An attacker can drive the vehicle passing RSUs to
build a fake meet-table, but the process is very costly
and easy to detect. This physical attack hardly occurs
in a large scale. In addition, the movement pattern of
the attacker’s vehicle significantly differs from an ordinary
human’s reproducible pattern[6] , and it is very easy to detect
with the help of the global meet-table.
In general, DoS, especially Distributed DoS (DDoS)
is hard to defeat if the opposite features adequate
resources[13] . In the proposed scheme, DoS, even DDos
faces difficulty in achieving its goal. If an attacker wants
to jam the broadcasting of an RSU, he must be present
at the RSU site. Thus, he can only attack a very limited
number of RSUs. Given the matured protection technology
of cloud computing, the attacker experiences difficulty
in blocking the negative message pushed from the cloud
service or in stopping cloud service. An attacker can
broadcast a huge number of garbage messages to a limited
part of a VANET and affect a limited area, but he can
not affect the whole VANET, and its main part given that
it is distributed, executes asynchronously, and contains
numerous RSUs and vehicles.
In summary, the scheme is secure to face these
four types of attacks if implemented carefully as it is
distributed, executes asynchronously, includes numerous
entities, and is based on cloud computing technology.
Table 3
Parameter
Number of vehicles

5

Simulation

We evaluate the performances of the meet-cloud and
other message distribution methods via simulations.
Furthermore, we evaluate the meet-cloud under DoS
attacks of RSUs and fake meet-table attacks. The results
are presented and analyzed in this section.
5.1

Simulation dataset

Simulation of a VANET can use the dataset of realistic
traces of vehicles[14] or the generated traces based on a
map[4, 15] . The realistic trace dataset of numerous vehicles
is hard to obtain. The dataset used in Ref. [14] includes
realistic taxi GPS traces from Shenzhen and Beijing, China
and San Francisco, USA. The total number of vehicles in
this dataset is about 13 000, and it contains only taxi and
no other type of vehicles. In addition, the time length of
this dataset reaches no more than three days.
To evaluate the performance and anti-attack ability of
the proposed meet-cloud, we generate a dataset to simulate
all vehicles in San Francisco, USA. The dataset is created
based on the parameters shown in Table 3.
On the generated dataset, the percentages of vehicles
and RSUs a vehicle met versus time are shown in Figs. 3a
and 3b.
From Fig. 3, we can observe that both percentages of
vehicles and RSUs met continually increase initially, but
remain static after a point of time. This pattern represents
the locality of vehicles’ movements. Thus, the generated
dataset possesses the same attribute of human movements
in real daily life[14] .
5.2

Performance simulations of different distribution
methods

To compare the performances of the proposed meet-cloud
with the RSU broadcast and epidemic models, we simulate
these three methods on the generated dataset. Figure 4
shows the simulation results.

Parameters for generating simulation dataset.

Value
471 388

Note
Total number of vehicles in Ref. [16].

Number of RSUs

1193

Refer to the number of signalized intersections in Ref. [16].

Intersections

7200

Estimated number of intersections in Ref. [16].

Length of road

1 741 km

Total length of road in Ref. [16].

Area

121 km2

Area - Land in Ref. [16].

Mean travel time
Speed

0.5 h
38.6 km/h

383

Mean Travel Time to Work in Ref. [16].
Average speed of commuter traffic speeds in Ref. [17].

maxV2I

100 m

Max communication distance of vehicle to RSU

maxV2V

10 m

Max communication distance of vehicle to vehicle
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Fig. 3

Percentage of vehicles and RSUs met on the simulation dataset.

Table 4 summarizes the performance simulation
results.
According to Table 4 and Evaluation-Criterion-1, as
the proposed meet-cloud features both high coverage
percentage and high accurate coverage percentage, and
mid message delay, it is the best method for distributing
negative messages in a VANET.
5.3 Fake meet-table attack simulations
To study the performance of the meet-cloud under a fake
meet-table attack, we randomly add records into the meettable of RSUs and perform simulations. Figure 5 displays

Fig. 4

Performance of different distribution methods.

Table 4
Value name

the performances of different ratios of fake meet-table
records.
From Fig. 5, we can observe that the fake meet-table
guides the meet-cloud to act similarly to the epidemic
model. The higher ratio of fake meet-table records makes
meet-cloud more similar to the epidemic model. However,
the fake meet-table attack can only lead to low accurate
coverage percentage and not low coverage percentage.
In other words, a fake meet-table attack can only affect
the accuracy of negative message distribution but not the
distribution range of negative message. As a result, the
meet-cloud is secure under fake meet-table attacks.

Summary of performance simulation results.
Epidemic model

RSU broadcast

Meet-table based scheme

Percent of vehicles possessing message

Much high

High

Low

Coverage percentage

Much high

High

High

Accurate coverage percentage

Low

Low

High

Message delay

Low

High

Mid
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Fig. 5

385

Performance of meet-cloud under fake meet-table attack.

5.4 DoS of RSUs simulations
We randomly turn off the RSUs to simulate DoS attack of
RSUs. Figure 6 illustrates the performance of the meetcloud with different ratios of RSUs turned off.
From Fig. 6, we can observe that DoS of RSUs can
not heavily affect the performance of the meet-cloud.
Therefore, the proposed meet-cloud is secure in facing
DoS attacks.
5.5 Discovery from attack simulation
In a fake meet-table attack, we note that fake records in
the meet-table may lead the meet-cloud to act like the
epidemic model. In the DoS attack, we observe that
turning off RSUs can not heavily affect the performance
of the meet-cloud. These attributes of meet-cloud make it
secure to face these attacks.
However, the proposed meet-cloud possesses attributes
of both RSU broadcast and epidemic model. The meetcloud uses the meet-table to select several RSUs as the
start points of epidemic model. As a result, at a high ratio
of fake meet-table records, the epidemic model attribute of

the meet-cloud enhances, and the meet-cloud acts similarly
to epidemic model. When the DoS of RSUs occurs, several
RSUs are turned off, and the start points of the epidemic
model lessen. As the epidemic model still exhibits an
exponential distributing ability if only one start point is
present, the epidemic model can still distribute messages
around the point rapidly.

6

Related Work

Enhancing the safety of transportation is the major goal
of a VANET. To achieve this goal, the VANET must
gather, process, and disseminate information, such as road
condition, the position of obstacles, speed limit, and road
accidents[1] . With the development of a VANET, especially
when self-driving cars run on the road, its security will be
the key to safe transportation.
Securing a VANET requires ID authentication,
message integrity,
communication confidentiality,
availability, and access control[18] .
To satisfy these
requirements, a number of solutions have been proposed.
In these solutions, public key cryptography, trust

Tsinghua Science and Technology, August 2018, 23(4): 377–388

386

Fig. 6

Performance of meet-cloud under DoS of RSUs.

management, and black list are employed. Therefore,
securing a VANET requires processing messages about
security in a secure and efficient manner. As elsewhere,
the certificates used in a VANET must be revoked in
circumstances such as the compromise or loss of a private
key and illegal use of certificates[19] .
The CA can issue a CRL and store it on a Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server for retrieval[20] .
A vehicle can also use an Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) to request for a CRL[21] . Instead of directly
accessing the Internet, a vehicle in a VANET often
accesses the Internet through an infrastructure domain.
Thus, both retrieving CRL from an LDAP server and
requesting CRL using OCSP are inapplicable.
VII tries to distribute CRL to vehicles through RSU
broadcast[3] . This method requires a very large number of
RSUs and is costly. In Ref. [4], Haas et al. attempted to
propagate a CRL in an epidemic fashion. The epidemic
method can distribute CRLs to all vehicles with a less
number of RSUs and less time, but it requires large storage
and communication capacity in the VANET.

In Ref. [6], the mobile phone users’ trajectories
prove that human movements follow simple reproducible
patterns. According to the research results in Refs. [14,
22, 23], a VANET is a small world. In Ref. [24], a
query processing algorithm that can determine the scope
of each query is used to help a vehicle to avoid returning
overwhelming amount results. These works give us clues
to accurately distributing messages in a VANET.
Our previous work proposed the meet-table to optimize
CRL propagation in a VANET[5] . Our other previous
work proposed the concept of negative message and gave
a scheme to distribute negative messages based on the
meet-table and cloud computing[7] . Both works opted not
to simulate the security of the meet-table. In the current
work, we simulate fake meet-table attack and DoS attack
of RSUs and analyze the simulation results.

7

Conclusion

We extend the concept of negative messages to negative
message documents in a VANET, formally define the
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coverage percentage and the accurate coverage percentage,
and present the evaluation criteria of distribution method
accordingly. Through formal analysis of the proposed
meet-cloud, we observe that the meet-cloud features low
communication and storage complexities in comparison
with the RSU broadcast and epidemic model. The
simulation results show that the meet-cloud achieves both
high coverage percentage and high accurate coverage
percentage and mid message delay. The simulation results
of the fake meet-table attack and the DoS attack of RSUs
demonstrate that meet-cloud is secure and works properly
under these attacks. Therefore, the meet-cloud performs
better than the RSU broadcast and epidemic model in
distributing negative messages in a VANET.
Via analyzing the results under the attacks, we
recognize that the meet-cloud possesses the attributes of
both RSU broadcast and epidemic model. The meet-cloud
uses the meet-table to select several RSUs as the start
points of the epidemic model.
In our future work, we will apply fog computing[25, 26]
to optimize meet-cloud, to reduce bandwidth and storage
requirements of the cloud service, and to move the
computing requirements from cloud to the edge.
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